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Abstract—Adversarial data poisoning is an effective attack
against machine learning and threatens model integrity by
introducing poisoned data into the training dataset. So far, it
has been studied mostly for classification, even though regression
learning is used in many mission critical systems (such as dosage
of medication, control of cyber-physical systems and managing
power supply). Therefore, in the present research, we aim to
evaluate all aspects of data poisoning attacks on regression
learning, exceeding previous work both in terms of breadth and
depth. We present realistic scenarios in which data poisoning
attacks threaten production systems and introduce a novel black-
box attack, which is then applied to a real-word medical use-case.
As a result, we observe that the mean squared error (MSE) of
the regressor increases to 150 percent due to inserting only two
percent of poison samples. Finally, we present a new defense
strategy against the novel and previous attacks and evaluate
it thoroughly on 26 datasets. As a result of the conducted
experiments, we conclude that the proposed defence strategy
effectively mitigates the considered attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regression learning is increasingly used in mission-critical
systems: In medicine for the development of pharmaceuticals
[9], [13], in the financial sector for predictive analysis, such as
managing hedge funds [18], [24] and cash forecasting [10], as
well as for predictive maintenance [19] and quality control [7].
As we rely more and more on these systems, researchers
find that they are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Two strains
of attacks can be distinguished. Attacks at test time (evasion)
and attacks at training time (poisoning) [16]. In this work,
we focus on the latter. Poisoning attacks introduce a small
fraction of ’poisoned samples’ into the training process, which
maximally ’confuses’ the learner and causes either a denial
of service (i.e., renders the model useless with respect to its
original intent), or introduces a ’backdoor’, which gives the
attacker control over the model at test time.
These attacks (and corresponding defenses) have been
studied by the scientific community in detail for classification
learning [3], [5], [21], [23], [25]. However, there is almost no
research on adversarial poisoning attacks (and corresponding
defenses) for regression learning. We find only a single
contribution [12] for regression learning, even though regression
is used in many mission-critical systems as described above.
As an example, consider the following medical scenario.
The blood thinner Warfarin has a very small therapeutic
window; too high dosage leads to bleeding, while too low
dosage leads to clotting [6]. Machine learning can help in
estimating the correct dosage, and pharmaceutic companies
provide appropriate datasets [11] on which regression learning
has been successfully applied [14], [22].
However, such an estimation is susceptible to data poisoning
attacks: A malicious entity may introduce a very small
percentage of ’poisoned samples’ into the dataset. Motives for
such an attack can be manifold: Personal motives (a malignant
doctor, underpaid caregiver or simply a psychopath nurse [8]),
financial motives (one company damaging another company’s
reputation, or an individual betting on the crash of some
company’s stock value, similar to [20]), or even political or
terrorist motives.
Such poisoning attacks are not just theoretical threats: Since
even small data poisoning can have significant effect, such an
attack is practicable even by an individual. Related work has
shown that data poisoning is feasible and has already been
observed in real-life scenarios [5], [21]. To address this issue,
we
• show the harmfulness of data poisoning in regression
by means of studying the problem of Warfarin dose
prediction,
• present a new black-box attack which exceeds previous
state-of-the-art, and for the first time evaluate poisoning
attacks on nonlinear regression learners,
• present an improvement to previously suggested defenses
which consistently outperforms the baseline,
• thoroughly evaluate our attack and defense on 26 datasets
and state-of-the-art regression learners, i.e. Neural Net-
works, Kernel SVR, and Kernel Regression,
• and publish all source code and experiments to enable
full reproducibility.
II. CASE STUDY: WARFARIN DOSE ESTIMATION
In order to demonstrate the effect of even small fractions of
poison samples, we examine the medical use case of Warfarin
dose prediction in this section. The International Warfarin Phar-
macogenetics Consortium [11], a group of pharmocogenetic
research centers, have created the IWCP dataset (Warfarin
dataset). It is the joint effort of 59 contributors, resulting in an
average contribution of 1.7% of the data per member. Based
on this dataset, models have been developed which predict the
therapeutic dose of Warfarin for a patient [14], [22].
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We use a new black-box poisoning attack(to be detailed in
Section IV-C) and add 2% poison data to the Warfarin dataset,
which is about as much as the average IWPC contributor did.
Table I shows the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of different
models after training on this dataset. In the absence of poison
samples, the MAE of models like Lasso, Elastic Net and Ridge
is around 8.50, which is comparable to state of the art [14].
When adding just 2% of data poisoning, the median error
increases to 11.07 (a 29 percent increase). This has tangible
effect on the patients: The rate of acceptable doses1 decreases
by 21%.
Model CleanError
Pois.
Error
Increase
MAE
Decrease
accep. Dosages
Elastic Net 8.52 11.07 1.30 21.25%
Huber Reg. 8.40 8.46 1.01 -1.09%
Kernel Ridge 8.41 10.98 1.31 21.07%
Lasso 8.49 11.20 1.32 22.31%
MLP 10.05 12.33 1.23 11.41%
Ridge Reg. 8.49 10.99 1.29 22.34%
SVR 10.85 12.52 1.15 14.13%
Median 8.49 11.07 1.29 21.07%
TABLE I: Mean absolute error (MAE) of different regression
models when poisoning the Warfarin dataset. The first column
shows the MAE when no data poisoning is present. The
second column shows the MAE when 2% poison samples
are introduced, with the relative change indicated by the third
column. The poisoning strongly affects the amount of patients
who receive an acceptable dosage of Warfarin (fourth column).
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give a short overview on existing literature
on data poisoning.
A. Poisoning Attacks in Classification
Early work on data poisoning attacks against classifiers
include [3], [25], which use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions
to find optimal poisoning samples against linear models. [3]
first develops a poisoning attack against SVMs. [25] considers
the security of feature selection against poisoning attacks and
adapts the approach for LASSO, Ridge Regression and Elastic
Net. In both scenarios the attacker attempts to increase the
test error and, thus, decrease the overall performance of the
classifier.
[15] are the first to extent data poisoning to the multi-
class scenario, which allows for targeted attacks. Instead of
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, they use back-gradient
optimization to generate the first poison samples for neural
networks in an end-to-end fashion without the requirement of
a surrogate model. While these first results indicate a higher
resilience of deep neural networks against availability attacks,
[15] also shows the effectiveness of this approach against
simpler models like MLPs with a single hidden layer.
1Following [14], we measure the percentage of patients whose predicted
dose of Warfarin is within 20% of the true therapeutic dose. This is referred
to as an acceptable dose.
[21] build upon the work of [15] and demonstrate reliable
clean-label attacks, in which the attacker can control the input
data X, but not the corresponding labels y. The attackers
objective is to achieve misclassification of a certain instance as
another class at test time. For a transfer learning scenario, they
show, that a single poison sample is capable of successfully
poisoning a classifier. For end-to-end learning settings they
develop a watermarking approach to poisoning.
B. Poisoning Attacks in Regression
Data poisoning has so far been examined almost exclusively
for classification learning. For regression learning, there is
work only by Jagielski et al. [12]. They build upon work by
Xiao et al. [25], who introduce a gradient-based optimisation
attack for linear classifiers such as Lasso, Ridge Regression
and Elastic Net for feature selection. Jagielski et al. [12] use
the same approach for the same models, but interpret the
model’s decision surface as a predictor for the continuous
target variable, yielding a poisoning attack for linear regression.
Additionally, they introduce a non-gradient based attack, plus
a defense called Trim and evaluate it on three datasets. Their
approach in evaluating the defense is, however, not applicable
in practice, since they use an oracle to determine the defense’s
hyper parameters. More specifically, they assume they know
the fraction  of poisoned samples in the dataset of size n,
which is generally unknown.
Nonlinear regressors such as Kernel Ridge, Kernel SVM and
Neural Networks have, to the best of our knowledge, not yet
been examined in the context of adversarial poisoning. This
may be because the attack presented in [25] is not applicable
to nonlinear learners.
IV. POISONING ATTACKS IN REGRESSION
In this section, we present our threat model, previously
suggested attacks and our proposed and improved attack. A
thorough evaluation on 26 datasets is given in Section VI.
A. Threat Model
We consider a realistic attack scenario where the attacker
has only limited capabilities, such as for example a malicious
individual could have. Specifically, we consider black-box
attacks where 1) the attacker knows nothing about the model
(not even what kind of regressor is used), 2) the attacker does
not have access to the training dataset (X,y), but only to
a smaller substitute dataset (Xsub,ysub), and 3) where the
attacker is capable of fully controlling the n data samples he
contributes to the dataset. He is not able to manipulate the rest
of the data.
As indicated in the introduction and Section II, the possibility
of introducing small amounts of poison data into the dataset
is highly realistic. If the data are crawled and collected
automatically, malicious instances just need to be placed where
the crawler can find them [17], [21]. If data are collected
manually, the ability to poison a dataset is proportional to an
individual’s contribution to the dataset. As detailed in Section
II, the Warfarin dataset is collected by 59 individuals; thus, an
average contribution constitutes about 2% of the dataset. We
show that this amount of poisoning is sufficient to effectively
poison the dataset (c.f. Section II, VI-D, and VII).
B. Related Poisoning Attacks in Regression
[12] present both a white box and a black-box attack on
regression learning. In this section, we present these attacks
and and their limitations.
1) Related White Box Attacks: Deriving from [25], a white-
box attack on linear regressors is presented in [12]. The
attacker’s objective is formulated as a bilevel optimization
problem as follows:
arg max
Dp
W(D′, θp) (1)
s.t. θp ∈ arg min
θ
L(Dtr ∪Dp, θ) (2)
Equation 2 is the usual minimization of the model loss L
during the fitting of a model on both the clean training dataset
Dtr and the poisoned dataset Dp. This yields an optimal set
of weights θp. This is called the ’inner optimisation’.
Equation 1 refers to maximising the attacker’s objective W
with respect to some test set D′, using the model’s weights
as determined by Equation 2. Minimizing Equation 1 depends
on the solution of Equation 2, which is why it is considered
a bilevel optimization problem. This is a hard problem: The
attacker has to determine how the points they introduce in
the dataset will change the model weights during training.
[12], [25] solve this using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions as a set of conditions which they assume remain
satisfied when a given poison sample xc is introduced. They
then proceed in solving a linear system, and, thus, derive the
gradients.
This approach is not feasible in deep neural networks [15],
since the time required for solving the linear system is in O(p3),
where p is the number of parameters in the model. Since even
small, commonly used pretrained models have a few million
parameters [1], the computation is not feasible. Even with
simplifying assumptions or a sufficiently small number of
parameters, this approach still requires an exact solution to the
optimization problem, which, in general, can not be obtained.
For a more detailed analysis we refer to [15].
2) Related Black-Box Attacks: [12] also present a black-
box attack called StatP. This attack samples n points from
a multivariate Gaussian distribution, where the corresponding
mean µ and co-variance matrix Σ are estimated as the mean
and co-variance of the true dataset Dtr. Then, StatP rounds
the feature variables to the corners, queries the model and
rounds the target variable to the opposite corner. The corners
are defined as the minimum and maximum of the feasibility
domain γ of each variable. Both features and target are scaled
to [0, 1], thus the feasibility domain is a hypercube [0, 1]d+1
where d is the number of features. In summary, this attack
creates a few isolated clusters of adversarial data, where both
features and target take only extreme values of either γmin = 0
or γmax = 1.
Algorithm 1 Flip attack
Require:
1: Substitute data Xsub,ysub of size m
2: Number of poison points dne to compute
3: Feasibility domain [γmin, γmax] of the target values
4: function Flip
5: ∆←− ∅
6: for i ∈ [1, ...,m] do
7: ∆i ←− max(ysubi − γmin, γmax − ysubi )
8: ∆←−∆ ∪∆i
9: end for
10: T ←− t ∈ R s.t. t is the dne-th highest value of ∆
11: I ←− {i ∈ [1, ...,m] s.t. di >= T where di ∈ ∆}
12: Xp ←− ∅, yp ←− ∅
13: for i ∈ I do
14: if yi > 12 (γmax − γmin) then
15: yp,i ←− γmin
16: yp ←− yp ∪ yp,i
17: else
18: yp,i ←− γmax
19: yp ←− yp ∪ yp,i
20: end if
21: Xp ←− Xp ∪Xsubi
22: end for
23: return Xp,yp
24: end function
This attack, however, still requires access to the trained black-
box model, which may be unrealistic in a real-world scenario.
Additionally, we find that while this attack is successful on
linear models, it is unsuccessful when applied to non-linear
models. We show this empirically in Section VI, but give a brief
explanation here: Nonlinear learners (such as Neural Networks,
Kernel SVR, and Kernel Regression) are able to accommodate
both the poison points and the true data simultaneously. This is
because the poison data created by StatP does not contradict the
true data points, since true data points rarely have features in the
corners of the feasibility domain. This insight will motivate our
proposed Flip attack on nonlinear learners, which we present
in the next section.
C. Flip: A Black-Box Attack on Nonlinear Regressors
Algorithm 1 presents our proposed black-box attack called
Flip. This algorithm computes a set of adversarial poisoning
points for any degree of poisoning 0 <  < 1. The attack
is completely independent of the regressor model and only
requires a substitute dataset (Xsub,ysub) from the same domain
as the training dataset Dtr and a feasibility domain of the target
variables [γmin, γmax]. The feasibility domain is necessary
because we usually assume that only certain target variables
are valid. Other values are bound to raise suspicion, such as
for example a room temperature of −400 degrees Celsius, or
medical doses that are extremely high or low.
We now describe our attack. After having initialised an
empty set ∆ in line 2, we populate it in the following for loop
(line 3-6). For each instance in the substitute dataset, we find
the maximum of the distance to the lower or upper end of the
feasibility domain, and save the results to ∆. Then, in line 7
we find the dne-highest value t ∈ R in ∆. This is used in
line 8 to compute the indices of those points for which there
is most potential to disturb. Thus, the rational of line 7-8 is
to find those points for which the target value is closest to
either γmin or γmax. These values are the ones which can
be maximally disturbed by shifting the target variable to the
other side of the feasibility domain. This is implemented in
line 10-19, where we compute the poison set by retaining
the feature values and ’flipping’ the target value to the other
side of the feasibility domain for the appropriate candidates as
specified by I. Finally, in line 20, we return the found poison
data.
V. DATA POISONING DEFENSES
In this section, we present defenses for adversarial data
poisoning in regression. First, we propose a set of requirements
to make a defense applicable in practice. Second, we evaluate
existing defenses with respect to these requirements. Finally,
we present our improvement over the baseline. A quantitative
evaluation is given in Section VI, while a qualitative evaluation
is presented in Section VII.
A. Requirements for Data Poisoning Defenses
When creating a dataset such as [11], the defender does not
know the degree of data poisoning, if any. Put differently, while
 might be known to the attacker, it is unknown to the defender.
It is also entirely possible that no poisoning has happened, i.e.
that  = 0. Thus, the quality of a defense should not depend
too much on a correct guess of , and should not deteriorate
the quality of an unpoisoned dataset. With this requirement in
mind, we proceed to present existing defenses and evaluate
them against it.
B. Related Defenses
Since there exists so little work on poisoning in regression,
existing defenses are also few. Two defenses from the domain
of classification learning are presented in [23]. The Sphere
defense first computes centroids in the poisoned data, and then
removes points outside a spherical radius around the centroids.
The Slab defense ’projects points onto the line between the
centroids and then discards points that are too far away’ [23].
However, [23] themselves note that these defenses may leave
datasets vulnerable, and present an example based on the IMDB
classification dataset where both Sphere and Slab fail. For this
reason, we do not consider them to be viable.
The state-of-the-art defense is Trim [12], for which we give
pseudo-code in Algorithm 2. It is an iterative algorithm, which
first fits a regressor to a subset of the poisoned data, and
then iteratively calculates the error between the regressor’s
prediction on the train set and the train targets. It refits the
regressor on those points with the smallest error, and repeats
until a convergence criteria is met. Finally, it returns the points
with the smallest error as a ’cleaned’ dataset. The number of
Algorithm 2 Trim defense, as proposed in [12]
Require:
1: Poisoned dataset Dtr ∪Dp of combined size n
2: Some model loss L
3: Estimated fraction of poison points ˆ
4: function Trim
5: I(0) ← a random subset of indices with size n 11+ˆ
6: θ(0) ← arg minθ L(DI(0) , θ)
7: i← 0
8: while True do
9: i← i+ 1
10: I(i) ← subset, size n 11+ˆ , min. L(DI
(i)
, θi−1)
11: θ(i) ← arg minθ L(DI(i) , θ)
12: break if some convergence condition is met
13: end while
14: return DI
(i)
15: end function
points to fit on, and conversely, the number of points to discard,
is determined by a supplied parameter ˆ, the assumed degree
of poisoning. If ˆ = , the defense has been shown to work
very well [12]. However, this is not a realistic scenario, since
the defender does not know .
Consider Figure 1, where we poison three real-world
datasets from [12], including the Warfarin dataset, with a
poison data fraction of  = 0.04. Then, for each dataset,
we clean it using the Trim defense, where we supply ˆ ∈
[0.00, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.10] (i.e. we clean the poisoned
dataset with different estimates ˆ to quantify the effect of ˆ on
Trim). On the resulting data (which is partially or fully free
from poison samples, depending on ˆ), we train a regressor and
calculate the MSE on a separate test set. Then, we average the
MSE over all datasets and plot the median of the regressors
against ˆ.
We make one key observation: The effectiveness of Trim
highly depends on the correct choice of ˆ. Selecting ˆ below
the actual degree of poisoning results in not all poison samples
being removed and, thus, in an increase of the test MSE of
an regressor. Selecting ˆ above the actual degree of poisoning
results in pristine data being removed, which might also remove
relevant structure/information contained in the dataset and, as
a result, also increase test MSE. Therefore, a better selection
strategy than blind overestimation of ˆ is required.
C. The Iterative Trim Defense
As shown in the last subsection, the Trim defense has
the potential to accurately remove poison samples from a
given dataset, provided that ˆ is chosen correctly, but over-
or underestimating ˆ significantly decreases test performance.
From this result stems the motivation for our proposed Iterative
Trim defense (iTrim). This defense enhances Trim by an
iterative search for the best ˆ. In this section, we present this
algorithm and our proposal for selecting the ideal value for ˆ.
In Section VI, we show empirically on 26 datasets that iTrim
Fig. 1: Three real-world datasets (Warfarin, Loan and Housing
[12]) are poisoned with the Flip attack, where  = 0.04. We
then apply the Trim defense with different values of ˆ, and
train a regressor on the resulting dataset. Finally, we plot the
test MSE against ˆ, averaged over all datasets and regressors.
Observe that the Trim defense is highly dependent on the
correct choice of ˆ (in this case 0.04): If ˆ is estimated too
low, poison points remain in the training data, skewing the
regressor and causing high test loss. If ˆ is estimated too high,
legitimate points are removed with the poisoned points. This
loss in training data causes the regressor to learn a distribution
different from the test distribution, which also incurs higher
test loss. Thus, it is important to accurately estimate the degree
of poisoning ˆ.
Algorithm 3 iTrim defense
Require:
1: Poisoned dataset Dtr ∪Dp
2: Some model loss L
3: Maximum estimated poisoning rate max
4: Number of runs r
5: Threshold t
6: function iTrim
7: I ←
{
max
j
r−1 s.t. j ∈ {0, ..., r − 1}
}
8: for i ∈ I do
9: D(i) ← trim(Dtr ∪Dp,L, ˆ = i)
10: L(i) ← minθ L(D(i), θ)
11: end for
12: opt ← min{i ∈ I s.t. |L(i) − L(i−1)| < t}
13: return trim(Dtr ∪Dp,L, ˆ = opt)
14: end function
can be applied under realistic conditions to poisoned data, and
reliably identifies and removes the poisoned data.
1) Algorithm Description: Algorithm 3 details the iTrim
defense. It takes as arguments the poisoned dataset Dtr ∪Dp,
a loss L, and three scalar hyper parameters. The first, max, is
an estimate of the maximum possible poisoning rate. This hyper
parameter can be chosen arbitrarily large without impacting
the defense’s result, but if chosen correctly will improve run
time. The second hyper parameter specifies the number of runs
r. This hyper parameter does not have too much influence on
the algorithm’s performance; it influences together with max
which values of ˆ will be tried. The final hyper parameter, the
threshold t, does have impact on the algorithm’s performance,
and we will discuss how to chose it later on.
iTrim starts by calculating a set I of possible candidates
ˆ (line 2). The hyper parameters max and r define the right
bound and the number of points, respectively. Then, for each
candidate, calculate the cleaned dataset D(i) using Trim, train
the regressor and obtain the corresponding train loss L(i) (lines
3 - 4). Finally, the optimal value for ˆ is found when the error
in train loss between two consecutive losses L(i)−L(i−1) first
undercuts some threshold t (line 7). The dataset is cleaned
using Trim with this estimate, and the result is returned (line
8).
2) Poison Rate Selection: Before we give an intuition for our
algorithm and show the reasoning for our selection criterion, we
shortly address validation approaches to finding ˆ. As already
mentioned, ˆ is a hyper parameter of Trim. In machine learning,
a common approach to finding hyper parameters are validation
schemes, e.g. cross validation. But for this approach to work,
we require a clean validation dataset. Since we only have a
single dataset, we have to assume that any validation split will
contain poisoned instances, rendering conventional validation
approaches unsuited for finding hyper parameters in this setting.
Thus, we now proceed to explain our iterative approach
to finding ˆ: Consider Figure 2, where we apply Trim to
the Warfarin dataset poisoned with  = 0.04. The orange
dashed line shows the train loss for different candidate values
ˆ ∈ [0.00, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.10]. Note that for the correct
estimation of poisoning degree ˆ = 0.04, the train loss becomes
almost zero, decreasing several orders of magnitude compared
to ˆ = 0.00. Further increasing ˆ still decreases the train
MSE, but only insignificantly. Thus, the train loss can be
approximated by two straight lines, joined at a distinctive kink
where ˆ = . Figure 5 in the Supplementary Material shows
this for other real-world datasets. We can understand this kink
as the point where the dataset ceases to contain data which
incurs extremely high train loss - in other words, where all
adversarial poison data have been removed. This assumption
is supported by the blue line in Figure 2, which shows the
test MSE for the same Kernel Ridge regressor trained on the
thusly cleaned datasets. For ˆ = 0.04, the test loss is minimal.
For ˆ > 0.04, Trim starts to remove legitimate data (since all
poison data have been removed), which is why test performance
deteriorates. Section VI will verify this empirically.
Based on the insight that the train loss can be approximated
by two straight lines which intersect at , we develop our
selection criterion for ˆ. We define t as the maximum absolute
gradient of the straight line where ˆ >  (i.e. the slope of
the orange dashed line on the ’right’ side of the graph, where
all poison data have been removed). We will refer to this
straight as the normal straight. Then |L(i)−L(i−1)| is used to
approximate the gradient of the straight for each subinterval.
The division by the length of the interval is omitted since all
intervals are equidistant. We choose ˆ as the first candidate so
Fig. 2: Applying Trim to the Warfarin dataset, poisoned with
 = 0.04. The orange dashed line shows the averaged train
loss for different estimations of poisoning ˆ, using KernelRidge
regression. There is high train loss for ˆ = 0 and 0.02, because
in these cases, not all poison points in the dataset can be
removed. Once all adversarial poison data is removed (ˆ = 0.04,
the delta in train loss decreases by several orders of magnitude,
approaching zero. The line in blue shows the test error for
the same setup. Note that the best ˆ is indeed characterized
by sudden change of train loss, as indicated in the left figure.
Also note that for ˆ > 0.04, Trim starts to remove legitimate
data, which deteriorates test performance.
the estimated straight is normal (i.e. |L(i) − L(i−1)| < t).
3) Threshold Selection: iTrim is dependent on an appropriate
choice of the threshold t. If t is vastly too large, poison points
are left in the dataset. If t is too small, iTrim deteriorates to
Trim, and starts removing non-poison points. However, we
find that there is rather a large window of appropriate values
of t. This is because 1) we apply feature/target scaling to
[0, 1], and 2) the difference in train loss we observe once
all poisoned points are removed is dramatic (c.f. Figure 2).
Based on our evaluation on 26 datasets (c.f. Section VI-B),
we find empirically that choosing values between 0.05 and
0.0001 performs comparably, and thus decide on a threshold
t = 0.001. In summery, we find that:
• Trim lacks a mechanism to find a good estimate for the
percentage ˆ of poisoned points in the dataset.
• Over- and under estimation of ˆ deteriorate the dataset to
be cleaned.
• Appropriate values for ˆ can be found via iTrim.
VI. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our attack and defense algorithms
against 26 datasets. We show that we 1) can reliably poison
nonlinear and linear models while assuming a realistic black-
box threat model, and 2) defend against this attack better than
previously suggested defenses.
A. Experimental Setup
We try to make our experiment as general and realistic as
possible. First, we split each of the 26 datasets into a randomly
drawn substitute set of size 0.25, a train set of size 0.75 ∗ 0.8
and a test set of size 0.75∗0.2. For each combination of the 26
substitute datasets and  ∈ [0.00, 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.10],
we create a poisoned dataset using the respective attack, which
we append to the corresponding train set and shuffle. This
results in 6 ∗ 26 = 156 combinations of train dataset and
poisoning rate. This step does not depend on the regressors.
Then, for each regressor and each of the 156 poisoned train
datasets, we perform Cross-Validated Grid Search to find
suitable hyper parameters. Finally, for all 156 poisoned train
datasets and both defenses (Trim and iTrim, we clean each
of the 156 poisoned train datasets. We then train a regressor
and measure test error on the test data sets and report below.
Thus, in total we run 156 ∗ 7 ∗ 2 = 2184 experiments (7 being
the number of different regressors evaluated). The experiments
and source code are published to enable reproducibility2.
B. Datasets and Regressors
For our experiments, we use 26 datasets: Three datasets
introduced in [12], eight datasets from the GitHub repository
imbalanced dataset [4], and 15 datasets from the KEEL
regression repository [2]. Each dataset contains at least 1000
data points. For datasets where n > 10000, we randomly
sample a subset n = 10000. In keeping with [12], we scale
features and targets to [0, 1]. See Table III in the Supplementary
Material for a detailed summary.
We evaluate four linear models (HuberRegressor, Lasso,
Ridge, Elastic Net) and three non-linear models (Neural
Networks, Kernel Ridge with RBF kernel, and Support Vector
Regressor with RBF kernel). To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to evaluate poisoning attacks against non-linear
regressors.
C. Evaluation of StatP
In this section, we very briefly report the effectiveness of
StatP on non-linear regressors. As detailed in [12], the attack is
effective for linear regressors. We find, however, that it is not
effective when applied to non-linear learners. For example, a
Neural Network’s MSE remains nearly unchanged (from 0.051
to 0.055) when poisoned with ten percent of poison samples
created by StatP. In the Supplementary Material, we elaborate
this in more detail, and evaluate additional non-linear learners
such as Kernel SVM and Kernel Ridge, which we find to
behave similarly.
D. Evaluation of Flip
In this section, we present the results when evaluating our
proposed Flip attack against 26 datasets and seven regressors.
Figure 3 shows the performance of the Flip attack, averaged
over all datasets. Figure 7 in the Supplementary Material shows
results per dataset.
The attack is highly effective: When adding only 4% of
poison data, the MSE of most regressors doubles compared
to the non-poisoned case. We observe that all models seem
equally susceptible to our attack, with the exception of the
2See /https://github.com/Fraunhofer-AISEC/regression data poisoning
Fig. 3: Evaluation of our proposed Flip attack. This plot shows
the MSE for different poison rates per regressor, averaged over
all 26 datasets. Most regressors obtain a MSE of around 0.003
when  = 0, and all but two deteriorate linearly as  increases.
Figure 7 in the Supplementary Material shows the same results,
but for each dataset individually.
Huber Regressor and Support Vector Regressor, which are
designed to be outlier-resistant.
E. Evaluation of Trim and iTrim
In this section, we report the results when defending against
the Flip attack. We report both the performance of the Trim
defense and our proposed iTrim defense, and compare efficiency.
We set both ˆ = 0.14 (for Trim) and max = 0.14 (for iTrim)
to mimic the behaviour of a defender in a realistic scenario. A
defender would have to guess the percentage of poisoned data ,
with a preference for overestimation rather than underestimation
(as explained in Section V-C).
We proceed as follows: With varying degrees of poisoning,
we poison all 26 datasets using the Flip attack. Then, for each
regressor, we clean (i.e. ’defend’) the datasets using the Trim as
well as the iTrim defense (separately). We fit the regressor on
the thusly obtained dataset, and compare the test error against
a regressor trained on the ’clean’ data. Figure 4 shows the
median of all regressors for Trim (blue line) and iTrim (orange
dashed line)3.
We observe that both defenses are effective. However, iTrim
achieves higher performance than Trim, especially when there
is a large discrepancy between  and ˆ. This is due to iTrim’s
capability of more accurately estimating the degree of poisoning.
Especially for ˆ > , we see considerable improvement
due to iTrims more advanced estimate of . Trim is also
computationally feasible, despite its iterative approach: The
average runtime for defending a given dataset was 1.6 minutes.
A more detailed discussion can be found in the Supplementary
Material.
3 The Supplementary Material provides more details: Figure 8 presents the
results for each regressor individually, while Figure 9 depicts the results for
all 26 datasets.
Fig. 4: Evaluation of the Trim and iTrim defense. First, we
poison the 26 datasets using Flip. Then we apply the Trim or
iTrim defense, and calculate the test MSE. Finally, we normalize
by the baseline MSE - the error obtained by a model trained on
unpoisoned data. The resulting quotient represents the degree
to which the defenses can negate the Flip attack. We observe
that iTrim consistently outperforms Trim. More detailed, non-
averaged results are presented in Figure 8 and Figure 9 in the
Supplementary Material.
F. Runtime
In this section, we detail the runtime of the iTrim defense
algorithm. iTrim calls the Trim defense r times, which in
turn performs j fit operations of the regressor - until either
a convergence criterion is met, or the number of runs j is
exhausted. In our experiments, we set r = 6, j = 20. Running
the complete experiment (attacking all 26 datasets, for seven
regressors, and six poisoning rates ) results in 26∗6∗7 = 1092
calls to the iTrim defense. On a Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4860
v2 @ 2.60GHz with 96 cores, this takes about 120 minutes
when parallelizing into 15 separate processes. Thus, running a
single iTrim defense takes, on average, 120/1092 ∗ 15 = 1.6
minutes per 6-core process. Obviously, this is highly dependent
on the regressor’s complexity, the size of the dataset, the number
of features, and parallelism capabilities of the program code.
Still, this indicates the feasibility of applying the iTrim defense
in a real-world scenario, where after weeks, months or even
years of data gathering, running the iTrim incurs negligible
additional time overhead.
VII. WARFARIN REVISITED
In Section II we presented the medical use case of predicting
the therapeutic Warfarin dose and showed that data poisoning
can significantly impact the performance of regressors on the
task. In this section, we will illustrate the empirical results
of Section VI-E on the use case of Warfarin dose prediction,
where we consider three different scenarios: First, the (C)lean
case. In this scenario, no data poisoning occurs. This case will
be used as a baseline for measuring the effects of data poisoning
and defence. Second, the (P)oison case. In this scenario, the
attacker introduces 2% poison samples using the Flip attack
proposed in Section IV-C. No countermeasures are taken. Third,
TABLE II: Mean absolute error (MAE) of different regression models when poisoned using the Flip attack.
Model MAE C MAE P MAE D MAE P/C MAE D/C Accbl. P/C Accbl. D/C
Elastic Net 8.52 11.07 8.51 1.30 1.00 21.25 -0.82
Huber Reg. 8.40 8.46 8.41 1.01 1.00 -1.09 -0.82
Kernel Ridge 8.41 10.98 8.41 1.31 1.00 21.07 0.53
Lasso 8.49 11.20 8.49 1.32 1.00 22.31 0.00
MLP 10.05 12.33 9.86 1.23 0.98 11.41 -2.80
Ridge Reg. 8.49 10.99 8.51 1.29 1.00 22.34 1.06
SVR 10.85 12.52 11.19 1.15 1.03 14.13 2.90
Median 8.49 11.07 8.51 1.29 1.00 21.07 0.00
the (D)efended case. In this scenario the data are poisoned with
2% poison samples like in (P), but iTrim is used as a counter
measure. The results for these three scenarios are summarized
in Table II.
To recapitulate: Warfarin is a blood thinner with a narrow
therapeutic window resulting in high medical significance for
the correct prediction of the therapeutic Warfarin dose. The
scenarios (C) and (P) have already been presented in Section II.
To summarize: The models used in our evaluation perform
comparable to state-of-the-art models and 2% poison samples
are sufficient to noticeably increase metrics like the MAE and
to decrease the number of patients receiving an acceptable
dose of Warfarin by up to 22%.
In Table II the column ’MAE D/C’ provides the factor by
which the MAE of a regressor increases, when the dataset is
poisoned with 2% poison samples and then defended using
iTrim. As we can see, the median is 1.00, indicating that the
damage is mitigated. The individual values range from 0.98 to
1.03, which indicates that where previously Flip incurred an
increase in MAE of up to 31%, the iTrim defense reduces this
error increase to a tenth. In summary, the MAE of the tested
models in the (D) scenario is approximately the same as in
the (C) scenario, meaning the defense successfully eliminates
(most) of the negative impact of the poison samples.
The column Acceptable D/C gives the percentage by which
the number of patients receiving an acceptable Warfarin dose
decreases in the (D) scenario compared to the (C) scenario.
The median reduces from 21.07 in scenario (P) to a median
of close to 0 in scenario (D). This shows that the number
of patients receiving an unacceptable Warfarin dose due to
data poisoning is significantly reduced when the iTrim defense
is employed. In summary, we observe that the iTrim defense
decreases the influence of poison samples. It results in more
patients receiving adequate predictions for their therapeutic
Warfarin dose.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce a novel data poisoning attack on
regression learning as well as a matching defense mechanism.
We show the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense
algorithm in a large empirical evaluation over seven regressors
and 26 datasets. Both attack and defense assume realistic
constraints: The attack is black-box and doesn’t assume access
to the true dataset, but only a substitute dataset. The defense,
on the other hand, does not assume any knowledge of the
poisoning rate , but estimates it using an iterative approach.
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IX. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Fig. 5: Similarly to Figure 2, we plot the train vs test error
of a KernelRidge regressor on a dataset (loan) poisoned with
ˆ = 0.04. We observe that the train loss gives clear indication
as to when all poison samples are removed via iTrim.
A. Evaluation of the StatP Attack
In this section, we evaluate the performance of existing
poisoning attacks on regression learning. As described in
Section IV-B, the only poisoning attack in literature which
we can directly apply to regression models in a black box
scenario is the StatP attack [12]. We implement this attack and
evaluate it twice: First, we apply the attack on the Warfarin
dataset and three non-linear models. Second, we evaluate all
26 datasets against both the statP and Flip attack (Figure 7).
We observe the following: 1.For nonlinear regressors, StatP
is ineffective. The MAE remains near constant when adding
even significant amounts of poison samples (see Figure 6).
First, when analyzing the poison data created by StatP, we find
an intuitive explanation for this: StatP pushes all data points
’to the corners’, i.e. to the edge of the feasibility domain.
While these data do conflict with the ’clean’ data for linear
regressors, nonlinear models can easily accommodate both
poison and clean data, as long as the samples don’t overlap in
feature-space. Second, when evaluatingk both attacks on all 26
datasets, averaging four linear and three non-linear models, we
Fig. 6: Evaluation of the performance of the StatP attack [12]
against nonlinear regressors. The StatP attack is applied to
three nonlinear regressors, averaged over all 26 datasets. The x
axis shows the degree of poisoning, while the y axis shows the
test MSE. The attack is not effective. While these do disturb
linear regressors, they are easily accommodated by nonlinear
models without increasing any test loss.
can confirm the above results. Flip consistently outperforms
StatP (c.f. Figure 7).
B. Datasets
The following table lists the datasets we use in our exper-
iments. The datasets can be obtained at /https://sci2s.ugr.es/
keel/category.php?cat=reg and /https://github.com/paobranco/
Imbalanced-Regression-DataSets and from [12].
TABLE III: The 26 datasets we use in our experiments
Name features n
0 ANACALT.dat 7.0 4052.0
1 accel 22.0 1732.0
2 ailerons.dat 40.0 13750.0
3 armesHousing 248.0 1460.0
4 availPwr 49.0 1802.0
5 bank8fm 8.0 4499.0
6 california.dat 8.0 20640.0
7 compactiv.dat 21.0 8192.0
8 concrete.dat 8.0 1030.0
9 cpu 12.0 8192.0
10 elevators.dat 18.0 16599.0
11 friedman.dat 5.0 1200.0
12 fuelCons 88.0 1764.0
13 heat 30.0 7400.0
14 house.dat 16.0 22784.0
15 loan 202.0 5000.0
16 mortgage.dat 15.0 1049.0
17 plastic.dat 2.0 1650.0
18 pole.dat 26.0 14998.0
19 quake.dat 3.0 2178.0
20 rings 10.0 4177.0
21 torque 95.0 1802.0
22 treasury.dat 15.0 1049.0
23 wankara.dat 9.0 1609.0
24 warfarin 177.0 5528.0
25 wizmir.dat 9.0 1461.0
Fig. 7: StatP (left) vs Flip (right). This plot shows the increase in MAE when using a poisoned dataset instead of a clean
dataset during model training. The results are averaged over all seven regressors, but displayed individually per dataset. For an
average over all datasets, refer to Figure 3. Left Image: All 26 datasets when attacked with the StatP attack. While the degree
of effectiveness varies between datasets, we generally observe a linear correlation between degree of poisoning and increase in
test error. Bottom Image: The same datasets attacked with the Flip. Note that this attack consistently outperforms StatP, as seen
on the higher MAE.
Fig. 8: Trim (left) vs. iTrim (right), averaged by dataset. Left: This plot shows the effectiveness of Trim when defending against
the Flip attack, averaged over all 26 datasets. datasets are poisoned as indicated on the x axis. Then, the Trim defense is applied,
the regressor is fitted to the dataset, and the resulting test MSE is compared against the test MSE on a clean, unpoisoned
dataset. We see that, depending on the regressor, datasets cleaned with Trim still incur significant decrease in test performance.
Right: The same process is applied to iTrim. We observe that test MSE is considerably decreased, especially for  < 0.08. The
larger , the more similar the two defences become. Additional information is provided by Figure 9.
Fig. 9: Trim (left) vs. iTrim (right), averaged by regressor. Similar to Figure 8, this plot shows the increase in MAE when using
a poisoned and subsequently defended dataset instead of a clean dataset during model training. The results are averaged over
all seven regressors, but displayed individually per dataset. Left Image: Increase in MAE when defending against a Flip attack
using Trim. Right Image: Increase in MAE when defending against a Flip attack using iTrim. Notice that iTrim outperforms
Trim almost consistently (as seen by the overall lower MAE, shown in bold black)
